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l,el Robinson's consistency theorem hold in logic L: then L will satisfy all the usual 
interlyt~lation a d definability properties, together with countable compacmess, provided L is 
reasonably small. The latter assumption can be weakened or removed by using special 
set-theoretical ssumptions, Thus, if Robinson's consistency theorem holds in L, then (i) L is 
ct~unlably compact if its L;3wenheina umber is <g~= the smallest uneom~table m asurable 
cardinal; (ii) if ~t} is the o,~y measurable cardinal, L is countably compact, or the theories of L 
characterize every structure up to isomorphism. As a corollary, a partial answer is given to H. 
Friedman's thil~.-I problem, by proving that tm logic I, strictly between I ...... and I ..... satisfies 
inlerpolation (or Robinson's consistency), unless [,,,elementary equivalence coincides with iso- 
nlorphiSlll, 
0. Introduction 
We study tt~,e interplay between compactness and interpolation in soft model 
theory. We give a partial answer to H. Fr iedman's third problem in [7], by 
proving that (if ~o is the only measurable cardinal) no logic L strictly between L=,, 
and L~,~ obeys the interpolation theorem, unless L-elementary equivalence coin- 
cides with isomorphism, (in which case Fr iedman's problem is still open). The key 
notion used throughout is Robinson's consistency theorem: its study yields a 
unified technique to deal both with logk~ which are small (see Corollaries 5.2 and 
5.3 below) and with the most general class of logics in which the sentences of a 
given t.vpe may be a proper class (see Corollary 5.4, Proposition 5.6 and Corollary 
5.7, the latter dealing with H. Fr iedman's third problem). The first sort of results 
is, incidentally, related with the important heorem stated in ',he postscriptum of 
[16]; the second sort of results shows the generality of our methods: in their 
embryonic stage, the techniques developed for the proof of our main result 
(Theorem 4.1) also had some algebraic application (see [21]): the latter, in turn, 
gives a partial answer to Fr iedman's fourth problem, upon restriction to countable 
structures (see also [19]), 
Theorem 4,1 below, establishing the first connection between notions of 
compactness and interpolation, states that if logic L has the Robinson property 
(i.e,, if Robinson's consistency theorem holds in L) and for all K ~o,  L is not 
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K-relatively compact, then the theories of L can characterize every single-so,,ted 
structure up to isomorphism. 
Relative compactness was studie6 by Makowsky and Shelah in [16] and 
furnished an important tool for invest,gating the interaction between compactness 
and descendingly incomplete ultrafilters, mainly in the light of [21], [12] and [9]. 
The latter papers and results are never used below. 
Robinson's consistency theorem was studied (in a slightly different form) ill 
[16]; in the present form it can be found in the postscriptum of [16], as well as in 
[18-23]; in [18] it is proved that 11o extension L of L(QO can be countably 
compact or axiomatizable, if Robinson's consistency theorem holds in L (notice 
that no special set-theoretical assumptions are involved). In [20], under V :: L or 
70 # or even ~L" ,  it is proved that full compactness+Craig's interpola:ion= 
Robinson's consistency in any extension of first-order logic having a i_6wcnheim 
number. 
However, this paper is independent of [18-231. As a matter of fact, the proof of 
Theorem 4.1, which is the main ingredient of all the other results of this paper, is 
self-contained: the preparatory lemmas in Section 2 were essentially proved also 
in [19]. 
Using Theorem 4.1 (or rather, its Corollary 4.2), in Theorem 5.1 we prove that 
if co is the only measurable cardinal, then every logic L having tile Robinson 
property is either countably compact, or else each single-sorted structure is 
characterized up to isomorphism by its complete theory in L. In case uncountable 
measurable cardinals exist, and/.ta is the smallest such cardinal, from the proof of 
Theorem 5.1 together with Corollary 4.2, one immediately has that either L is 
countably compact, or else L-equivalence coincides with isomorphism for every 
single-sorted structure of card;nality below go,. In Section 5, Theorem 5.l is 
applied both to logics subject to smallness conditions, such as having few 
quantifiers, or having a L/Swenheim number </xo, and to logi~ where a 
L6wenheim number may not exist, or the collection of sentences of any given type 
-r may be a proper class. 
Specifically, in Corollary 5.2 we prove that every countably generated logic 
having the Robinson property automatically satisfies countable compactness, 
Craig interpolation and all the other usual interpolation and definability proper- 
ties. 
In Corollary 5.3 we prove that if L has the Robinson property and has a 
L6wenheim number <txo, then t. is countably compact. 
Passing now to applications of Theorem 5.1 to large logic,s, in Corollary 5.4 we 
immediately obtain that if ~o is the only measurable cardinal and L~>L(Ot~) 
(where Oo is the quantifier 'there are infinitely many'), then either L-elementary 
equivalence coincides with isomorphism, or else Robinson's consistency theorem 
does not hold in L. In the above corollary one might equivalently replace L(Oo) 
by any logic which is not countably compact. This corollary exhibits a large 
collection of logics in which Robinson's consistency fails: for example, atl L with 
L(Qo) <<- L <~ L=.. where K I> ~o is an arbitrary cardinal. 
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Propositit)n 5.6 establishes the following implication, for all logics L ~ L.~o: 
Craig's inter polalion - - *  Robinson's consistency 
Notiee that no special set theoretical assumptions are it~volved here. 
From Corollary 5.4 and Proposition 5.6 we immediately obtain in Corollary 5.7 
the above mentioned result that no logic strictly between L~ and L~ satisfies 
interpolation, or Robinson's consistency theorem, unless its theories can charac- 
terize every structure up to isonmrphism. This theorem gives a partial answer to 
H. Friedman's third problem in [7]: 
"No logic slrictly between L~,.,, and [ .... obeys the interpolation theorem." 
Other particular cases of this problem were dealt with by [8], [14] and others. 
We assume familiarity with [4], [17] and [6. Sections 1 and 2]; for large logics 
the reader might: consult [. ], though only very simple facts about them are used 
here. 
For further information about Robinson's property, we refer the reader to [16, 
postscriptum] and to the above mentioned papers by the present author. 
In the light of Feferman's remark in [5], that (suitable generalizations of) 
c~mpactness and interpolation, together with axiomatizabifity, are the good 
properties one particularly has in mind when looking for proper extensions of 
first-order logic. Robinson's consistency theorem is certainly to have a role, both 
as an interpolation and as a compactness property (see [20): thus, for example, 
H. Friedman's fourth problem in [7] can be rephrased with no substantial loss as 
the problem of finding proper extensions of first-order logic having Robinson's 
property and a IJ5wenheim number (compare with the first problem in the 
introduction of [ 16). 
On the other hand, our results in Section 5 in this paper show that Robinsons 
property is a very strong requirement on logics; in particular, Corollaries 5.2 and 
5.3 suggest that if there exists any small logic L>L,~,o having Robinson's 
property, then L will share with L,,,o many of its good properties, and the extra 
expressive power of L is not to be easily found: in fact, by Theorem 5.1 and a 
well-known result due to Lindstr6m, no sublogic of L~.~ can be of any help to this 
search; further, one cannot hope that L >1 L(QO by the above mentioned result in 
[18]. 
The situation does not look better if we relax the bounds on the size of L: in 
fact, Corollary 5.4 exhibits a lot of large togit~ in which Robinson's theorem fails 
(if ~ is the only measurable cardinal). 
From the algebraic viewpoint (i,e. by only considering L-elementary equival- 
ence ----t_), in [21] it is proved that, upon restriction to countable structures :,f 
finite type, the only non-pathological equivalence relations alisfying Robinson's 
consistency theorem are elementary equivalence and isomorphism. 
The problems involved in the search of good equivalence r lations on structures 
in the general case. and the corresponding--more dillicult and fundamental-- 
problems concerning ood extensions ~)f first-order logic, can only be solved by 
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means of (i) a deeper study of the sensitivity of soft model theory to specific 
se~-theoretical axioms, and (ii) the introduction of powerful techniques allowing a 
unified treatment of both logi~ which are small and infinitary logics. 
Concerning (ii), the development of the tools introduced in this paper to prove 
Theorem 4.1, and centered around the notion of Robinson's consistency, might 
bring some profit. 
'Fhe author wishes to express his gratitude to the referee. 
1. Preliminaries 
Throughout this paper r, r', and r" will denote (many-sorted, similarity) types, 
i.e. sets of sorts and symbols as defined in [4]; we shall not require that types are 
finite. Str(r) is the class of all structures of type T, each structure ~1 ~ Str(r) being a 
function as defined in [4]; notice that the universe A of ~[ is always assumed to I~-" 
a set, whose cardinality is denoted by IAI; A, B and N are the universes of ?~, 
and ~ respectively. If B ' _  B and B' is noncmpty on each sort of ~, then ~ I B' is 
the substructure of ~ generated by B'. 
A logic L is an ordered pair (StcL, ~t.) satisfying the axioms of occurrence, 
expansion, renaming and isomorphism, and which is closed u~tder the firsl-order 
operations (see [4, pp. 155-157; 1, p. 234]). Note that in this paper all structures 
and all types are admitted; notice also that StcL(z) need not be a set and there 
need not exist any upper bound for the cardinality of the set of symbols occurring 
in the sentences of L. If ¢~StcL('r), then we simply say that ¢ is of type ,r. 
Formulas are dealt with exactly as in [4, p. 156]. In our lo~;ics L we allow 
relativization of formula q~ to formula t~(x, z~ . . . . .  z~), where the z's act as 
parameters: the result of this process is still a formula of L, written 
qg{x I ,/,~x. z ~....,z ",}. 
See [6] for the relat;onship between relativization and substructures. Examples L
of logics are L~ for ~ ~> t0 a cardinal, and L~ (see [3]); here, Stct (~-) is a proper 
class and in the sentences of L arbitrarily large sets of symbols (and sorts) occur. 
An important subclass of logi~ have the form L = L,~(O~)~i (see [17]): here 
Stct.(r) is a set, provided I is a set; in case [I1~o, i.e. L has countably many 
quantifiers, we say that L is countably generated: L~, is first-order logic and 
L(Qo) = L,~(Oo) is the logic with quantifier "there exist infinitely many" (see [15] 
or [17]). For ~! ~ Str(r), tht ~21 is the class of all sentences ¢ of t)ve r such that 
~I~L~; we often drop subscript L, if no confusion may arise; for T~_Stc~.(r) a 
theory in L, mOdLT is the class of those structures ?t such that ,~l,e-t T. Given 
structures ~,I and ~B, ?I-=-~.~ means that th~9[ ~::tht~ (read: ~I and ~ are L- 
elementarily equivalent). Given two Iogit~ L aild L', L<~L '  means 3hat 
whenever ~1 ~,~ then also ?l ~L~ (i.e., L'-elementary equivalence is finer than 
L-elementary equivalence); L~L '  means that for each type ~ and ff,~Stclo(r) 
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there is ¢¢'~ StCL.(r) with the same models. Following [17], we let I,~I = {~/~ l ~3 ~ s21}. 
For the notion of (K, A)-compactness, see [17] (the definiti~n is the same even 
for the more general class of logics considered in this paper); countable compact- 
ness means (~0,~o)-compactness; full compactness (or, shortly, compactness) is
0¢, ~o)-tx~mpactness for all ~ ~ to, 
In their paper [16] Makowsky and Shelah studied an important related notion, 
given by the following definition (compare with 116, definition after the statement 
of Theorem 6.2]): 
Definition 1.1. We say that L is ~-relatively compact (for short: K-r.c.), for K a 
cardinal ~o ,  iff for any classes of sentences S and/"  with 1~1 = K, if for all -~o~ v
with I~voi< k, SoU F is consistent, then v U 1" is consistent (i.e., ~ OF  has a 
model). 
For the notion of Craig 'rlterpolation property. A-closure, (weak) Beth prop- 
erty, see [17]; an important related notion, studied extensively in [19], is given by 
the following definition (compare with [11] for the first-orde," case): 
Definition 1.2. We say that in L Robinson's consistency theorem holds (or, L has 
the Robinson proper,y) iff given any types "r, ~" and ~'", and classes of sentences T, 
T' and T", if T is complete in ~" and T' and T" are consistent extensions of T in 
type ~' and r" respectively, with z = r'fq'r", then T 'U  T" is consistent. 
This is easily seen to be equivalent to saying that VPI'~ Str(C), VPl"6 Str(~'"), if 
~-=~"f'lz" and P['I~'-~L?l"~'r, then 3~5~Str(~-'Lt~-"~ such that ~IC=--LPI' and 
~I  ~"~ ~1". (Con-pare with El0] for the case of L,~.) 
Following [17, t~ 161 and p. 175] we give the following: 
Definition 1.3. We say that logic L satisfies the Lfwenheim-Skolew, (L-S) 
theorem for cardinal K iff every sentence 0 of L which has a madel, has a model of 
cardinality ~<K; the Lfwenheim number of L is the smallest cardinal K such that 
the L-S theorem holds for K in L; logic L satisfies the L-S theorem for cardinal 
for theories of cardinality ~h iff each consistent theory T of L with tTI ~: h has a 
model ,~ with 1~[[ ~< K. 
LiSwenheim-type requirements, as well as countable generatedness, impose 
restrictions on the size of logics. Under such restrictions we shall prove below that 
the Robinson property (i.e. an interpolation and definability property) implies 
countable compactness; restrictions about the size of logic L can be removed b3 
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introducing special set-theoretical assumptions, Sections 2, 3 and 4 below estab- 
lish some important facts about the Robinson property, which are subsequently 
used for the study of the relationship between compactness and interpolation 
properties both in small and in huge logics. 
2. 
Proposition 2.1. Let in L Robinson's consistency theorem hold; let (~t, <) be an 
infinite ordinal and assume that modL thL0t, <} = I(A, <) for all ordinals (X, <)~< 
(/~, <). Then we hare mOdL th~.9[ = I~I for every, single-sorted structure ~l with 
For the proof we prepare: 
Lemma 2.2. Under the hypotheses of Protn~sition 2.1 we haoe mod~ tht ~ ~ 1K ]'or 
any cardinal K <~lWt. 
Remark. Notice that thtK is a theory in the pure identity language of L. 
Proof. Assume v----L K and I vt ~ K; it is no loss of generality to assume that l t, l = v; 
let (r, <) denote the least ordinal of cardinality ~. 
Case 1: v> K; then consider expansion 
v'=(u,c~) .. . .  (for e an ordinal). 
By hypothesis 
thl_ v' U tht.(K, <} D_ tht. +< 
is inconsistent; but this contradicts the assumed Robinson property of L. 
Case 2: v< K; let (v, <) be the least ordinal of cardinality v and let the(K, <'} 
be the complete theory of {K, <} in type {<'} (with <' a binary relation symbol 
different from <); then 
t hL(+++ <') U tilL(v, <} _ tht. K 
is inconsistent by hypothesis, again contradicting the assumed Robinson property 
of L. [] 
Lemma 2.3. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 2.1, we have ~hat modt thL ~.~I~ = 
I~  for every single-sorted expansion ~J~ = (v~ < . . . .  } of each ordinal (v, <)<~ (tx, <}. 
Proof. Let ~2)'2, ~eStr ( r )  with ~zL~ =(v. < . . . .  ); by hyt~th~sis and by reduct, 
~'{<}~_~.I~'{<}; we assume without loss of generality that ~1~'{<}=~t'{<}; 
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assume ~.IR~  (absurdum hypothesis); then for some ordinal e < ~ an a for some 
symbol R e-r we have ~"nRe and ~Re (or vice ~ersa); notice that we have 
assumed R unary relation for simplicity; in the gener~,l case one shall work with 
r-tuplas of ordinals smaller than v, Let T'=th~.(~J,!,e) of type .'rO{n'} and 
T"~ tht.(~, e) of type ~r U{n"}. We claim that T'U T" is inconsistent; if not, let 
~1= T 'U T"; then ~ t' {<:} :~"-~ (v, <) by hytx~thesis, and ~.~: n '= n" by the assumed 
characterizability of e < v ~ ~ (one has to relativiz e thL(~:, <) to {x I x < n'} and to 
{x i x < n"}; then one notes that these two relativized theories are contained in T' 
and T" r:spectively); further, ~ ~ Rn' A~Rn" ,  which is clearly impossible. Having 
proved o~ar claim, we have also exhibited two consistent extensions T' and T" ot 
thLg~ which are counterexamples to the assumed Robinson property of L. K' 
Proal ot Proposition 2.1. Let P[, ~e  Str(~-), l~lt~ti with $~LPI ;  by Lemma 2.2 
I~1=t~1= v~, :  let 0', <) be the least ordinal of eardinality v; let ~ '=(~,  <:'} 
where <' well-orders B with order type (~,, <}; similarly let ~l'= {~.l, <) where < 
has order type (v. <}; by the Robinson property, the ~I'UthL~Y is consistent, i.e. 
there exists ~.R¢_-Str(,r U{<, <'}) with 
'i~ I" TU{<} ~,o ~l'. 
By Lemma 2.3, noting that ~'  and PI' are (isomorphic to) expansions of well- 






Proposition 3.1. Let in L Robinson's consistency theorem hold; let K be an infinite 
cardinal and (K, <) the least ordi~tal of cardinality K ; t~sume that L is not K-r.c. 
aad that mode thL(A, <}~: i(h, <) for all ordinals (,k, <}<(K, <). Then 
mode th~ (~:, <) = I(~, <'). 
P t~t .  By assumption there exist theories E with 1Ei = •, say, E = {~ [e < K} and 
F such that E U F is inconsistent but VE' c _w with J~v' I < ~ v, U F is consistent: let 
204 D. Mzmdici 
re be the type of E U F and assume, without loss of generality, that % has only 
relation symbols; for any ordinal ~ < K let E.. = {~.. ]e < eL} and let ~l. be such 
that 
Without loss of generality, assume that A~3 n A v = ~ whenever ~8 ~' 3'; expand % to 
~- by adding one new sort and new symbols 






where g is a unary function, < is a binary relation and the c,,'s are constants. Let 
~/REStr(r) have the following properties: 
• ~t{<.coL~ =(,q <, ~), . . . .  
range of g = K, 
domain of g = union of the universes of tile ~l,,'s. 
gq(~)=un iverse  of 21., A,, (e<K) .  
~[  r,, I g- ' (a)  =,%, (c~ < ~), 
can be imagined as a 'disjoint union' of the 91..'s equipped with an index 
g for their (pairwise disjoint) universes. RR satisfies theory T of type r 
the following axioms (here we use symbol I* for a variable over the new 
< is a linear ordering over the last sort and q, < e~, 
(2),~ <K 
the order type of the set of predecessors of q, is (a, <) 
(this is expressed by relativizing to {g t # < c.} theory thL(C~, <) which is assumed 
to characterize ~ up to isomorphism). 
(3)i ........ , .,, 
Vta -~x' g(x ~) = t~ 
(so that each inverse ima4e g-~(p.) is non-empty on each sort i of re). 
(4).<,, 
(so that Z~, is satisfied in the t~th inverse image of g), 
(5)o~r 
(so that also F is satisfied in the t~th inverse image of g). 
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Claim 1. ha any model 93~'I; the q,'s are unbounded, i.e. 
3b ~ 13 such that ~( ;~ < b ~t~ < ~. 
As a matter of fac~, if such ~ and b exist, then (~,b)  has the following 
properties: 
g-~(b)¢O on each sort of ~o by (3), 
Va<b,  q~,~ holds in ~' - ro[g-~(b)  by (4), 
F holds in ~3~-ro[ g- ' (b)  by (5), 
so that ,~7 U F is consi,',v:,nt, ~contradiction. 
Claim 2. V~T ~I{<}m~(~, <). 
As a matter of fact, by ~ 1) t~ ~' {<}1 > ~; ~ ~" {<} is well-ordered, for otherwise 
there is an infinitely descending chain a0> a~ > • •. ; by Claim 1, 3A <: K such that 
ca > ao in ~,  so that the set of precedessors of c~ is not well<wdered, contradict- 
ing (2) in view of the assumption about tht.(h, <). Similarly, any a c B has strictly 
less than K many predecessors, for otherwise, by Claim 1, 3A < ~¢ such that cx > a, 
and ca would not satisfy (2). 
Having proved Claim 2, we complete the proof of Proposition 3.1 as follows: 
assume 9~-~t (~, <) and ~J~  (K, <) (absurdum hypothesis), then 
(a) either ~ is not well-ordered, 
(b) or for some n s N the cardinatity of the set of predecessors of n is ~-K, 
{c) or, finally, l~J~t < K. 
Taking care of (a): if ~.~? is not well-ordered, let ao>a~ >""  be an infinitely 
descending chain in N; expand 9~ to ~ '=(~,  ao, a~ . . . .  ) and notice that g~'~T', 
where T' is defined by 
T':= thL(K, <)U{ao>alAa~a~A,  . .}. 
On the other hand, by Claim 2, the {<}-reduct of any model of T is well ordered, 
hence the union of theories T'  and TUthL(K, <) is inconsistent, both theories 
being consistent extensions of the complete theory thL{K, <) in such a way that 
Robinson's consistency theorem does not hold in L, a contradictk~;~. 
Taking care of (b); let some n ~ N have, say K many predecessols, {ax}~. , : then 
by a similar argument to (a) a~L×~ve, we see that a contradiction can be dra~, n from 
the assumed Robinson property of L and the inconsistency of the union of 
theories TUthL(~, <) and flh.(g~, n, d~)x.~,, both being consistent extensions of 
the complete theory tth (~, <), and having no common symbols except <. 
Taking care of (e): let )'qt = ~ with ~< K; expand 9~ to g~'= (g?, <') where <'  
well-orders N with order type (g, <) (viz. the least ordinal of eardinality ~); by 
assumption, if ~BIhL ~.1~' then ~ ~' {<'}~ {.(, <):  this shows in particular that I~t = ~, 
hen~x; the union of theories tthfF and TOthL(~, <) is inconsistent, lx]th theories 
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being consistent extensions of the complete theory thE(K, <) in such a way that 
Robinson's consistency theorem does not hold in L, a contradiction. 
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3. I. [] 
Corollary 3.2. Let in L Robinson's consisw:2cy theorem hold; ct~sume that L is not 
to-r.c.; then modt, thE(tO, <) = l(tO, <~). 
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3.1 by observing that all finite ordinals are 
characterizable t:p to isomorphism in L,o~ <~ L. [] 
4. 
We now draw some consequences from Propositions 2.1 and 3.1, rclating the 
expressive power of logic L to the class of cardinals ~ such that L is not ~-r.c. 
Theorem 4.1. Let L have the Robinson property; assume that [or every infinite 
cardinal K, L is not t<-r.c.; then ]'or any single-sorted structure 9I we have 
mOdE thL~ =/~.  
Proof. By induction on 19,~l~>to ( he finite case is trivial): 
Initial step: tg~t=to. Notice that mOdE thE(tO, <)=/(co, <) by Cordlary 3.2. 
Also, each finite ordinal is characterizable up to isomorphism in L ~-L~ ; now 
apply Proposition 2,1. 
Induction step: let (o~, <) be the least ordinal of cardinality IPlI; given any 
ordinal (18, <)<(a ,  <} we have that modr thL(f3,<)=l(/3,<) by induction 
hypothesis; then mOdE thE(a, <)= I(a, <) by Proposition 3.1 and mOdE thL~i = 
/9~ now follows from Proposition 2.1. [] 
Corollary 4.2. Let t, have Robinson's property, and let Ko be an infinite cardinal; 
assume that for all infinite cardinals K~KO, L is not K-r.c.; then for every 
single-sorted structure ~A with !$It ~ Ko, we have modt, thE9l = ~l. 
Proof. By truncating the induction argument of Theorem 4.1 after Ko. [] 
5. 
Theorem 5.1, (Assuming ¢o is the only measurable cardinal.) Let i ,  L Robinson's 
consistency theorem hold; then 
(i) either L is countably compact, 
Friedman "sddrd problem 2(t7 
(ii) or, for any two single-sorted structures ~21 and ~ we have 
Proo|. Assume L is not countably compact; to prove the theorem, by Theorem 
4.1, it suffices to prove that L is not ~-r.c. V~ ~to. As a matter of fact, if this were 
not the case, let 0 be the least cardinal such that L is 0-r.c.; notice that 0>to, 
otherwise L would also be countably compact. By Corollary 4.2 we have 
mode the_(/3, <)= I(~8, <> V/3 <0. (1) 
Detine the single-sorted type r by adding a symbol for each a<0,  X~O, 
f:O-~O, i .e., 
r = {<, ~,/.Ix, f} ...... x~,, ¢:,,-~o, (2) 
and structure ~2l c Str(v) 0;" 
~i=<O, <, a, X.f} <o.~o.¢:o- .o ,  (3) 
so that a~=m f~t=f, U~=X.  Let /-'= tht~21, and ~;..S =:{b>a la<O}, for b a new 
constant symbol; let ,~gv U 1~ such ~ existing by the assmned O-relative com- 
pactness of L; in particular 
I 'r ~L  ~.1, (4) 
Let ~ c P(0) be a collection of subsets of 0 given by 
Y~ i f f~cUr (b) ,  (5) 
(compare with [ 16, 6.4(ii)]L By (1)-(5) one sees that ~ is a nonprb :cipal ultrafilter 
on t9. 
Claim. ~ is O-complew, 
ProoL If not, ~ is tx-d.i, for some /~<0, so let ~'={Y,~},<, be a descending 
chain of elements of '~ of le~gth t* with Y=f) ,<, ,  ¥ ~  i.e,, without loss of 
generality, Y = ~. Let g : 0 ---, ~ be given by 
g(~)---/3 i f f ,e  Y~\Ys+, (a<0,18<tx). (6) 
By (2) and (3), function g is denoted by g itself in ~l; let similarly U,, ez be the 
only uv.ary relation symbol such that U~ = Y, (tx < ~). Now we have: 
Va < ta ~I, ~ LVx(g(x) ~ a --~-1U,, l(x)) by (4) and (6), 
~g~'¢{~</* g(b)>c~, by (1) and (4), 
(characterizability of /,t < 0); thus, we conclude that 
¢~,~rt~L3X(VOe<~ g(x)>a),  by (4). 
so that Y¢{;~. and the claim is proved by reductio ad absur~um. [] 
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Having proved our claim, we see that 8 > to is measurable, which contradicts 
our set-theoretical hypotheses; therefore L cannot be O-r.e. [] 
Theorem 5.1 can be applied to 'smalr logi~ as follows: 
CoroUm'y $,2. Let in L = L,~(O~)~<,~ Robinson's consistency theorem hold. Then 
we have: 
(i) L is countably eompa=t; 
(ii) L has Craig's interpolation, z~-closure and (weak) Beth property. 
Proof. (i) Immediate from Theorem 5.1, if there are no uncountable measurable 
cardinals, upon noting that there are no mor~-, thar~ 2 "~ complete theories in the 
pure identity language of any countably generated logic L. On the other hand, if 
tx o is the smallest uncountable measurable cardinal, then by inspection of the 
proof of Theorem 5.1 one sees that if L is not c6untably compact (absurdum 
hypothesis), then L is not ~¢-r.c. for each infinite ~ </x o. Then using Corollary 4.2 
we have that each single-sorted structure ,~I with ~,AI < Wo is characterizable up to 
isomorphism by its complete theory in L. Thus the number of complete theories 
in the pure identity language of L is >2 '°, which contradicts the assumption about 
L being countably generated. 
(ii) By (i), L is countably compact; this, together with L being countably 
generated and having Robinson's property is well known to imply Craig's interpo- 
lation property (see [16, 2.1]). The other interpolation and definability properties 
now follow from Craig's interpolation property, by well-known results in soft 
model theory (see [17] or [16]). [] 
Corollary 5.3. Let in L Robinson's consistency theorem hold. Assume the 
Lbwenheim number ,X of L exists and either A is strictly smaller than the first 
uncountable measurable cardinal V.o, or there are no uncountable me~tsurable 
cardinals at all. Thet~ L is countably compact. 
Proof. By a familiar argument (see [16, 1.6]) there are at most ~¢ many inequival- 
ent sentences in the pure identity language of L, where 
K = 22~ 
hence there are at most 2 ~ inequivalent theories in the pure identity language of 
L. On the other hand, by arguing '~s in the proof of Corollary 5.2 in the light of 
Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 4.2, we have that, if L is not countably compact 
(absurdum hypothesis), then there are at least Wo many inequi~alent complete 
theories in the pure identity language of L, ~nd ~o > 2 ~ since A < tao and V.o is well 
known to be strongly inaccessible. (If no uncountable measurable cardinals exist, 
the argument becomes trivial.) []  
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Theorem 5.1 can be applied to qarge' logics as follows: 
Corollary 5.4, (Assuming ~o is the only measurable cardinal.) Let L be such that 
L(Oo) ~< L; then either aa~ ~..: ~, or else Robinson's consistency theorem does not 
hold in L. 
Proof. Since L(Qo) is not countably compact, then so is L: now, if Robinson's 
theorem holds in L, then one simply applies Theorem 5,1 above to get the desired 
conclusion. [] 
Remark 5,5. Corollary 5,4 exhibils a very large class of Iogic~ in which Robin- 
son's consistency theorem fails: for example, all L with L(C)o)~ L <~ L .... where 
;eaj; actually the same holds by replacing Lr(Q 0) by any logic which is not 
countably compact, 
Propositien 5.6. I f  L > l~ ..... satiSrlies Craig's interpolation, then L satislies Robin- 
son's consistency theorem. 
Proof. Assume Robinson's consistency fails in L; then 
3P[' ~ Str(r'), 3~?["~ Str(r") such that, letting r = r' f3 r ' ,  we have (1) 
that Pl' ~" r ~z  W' ~" r, but f3~ c- Str(r' tO r") such that ~ I' r '  ----L 9l' 
and ~ l '  r"-=zW'. 
Let now -r a, be the diagram type (also called diagram language) of 9I' (see [11, 
p. 57]7, and let ~l~v be the diagram expansion of ~,I'; let D(91') be the diagram of 
~2l':x,, i.e. the set of all atomic and negated atomic sentences of type ~'A. which are 
true in ~,~t;x,: recall the basic fact that universes of structures are sets. It is well 
known that structure ~,~I'v can be characterized up to isomorphism by the sentence 
q~' ~ Stct ,,,,(%x') given by 
AD(W)AVx V a ' : :x ,  
(see [1l, p. 96]): similarly, 91~,., is characterized by the sentence tp"~Stct.~(rA,,) 
given by 
AD(  ~'~l'')Avx V x=~:a". 
~C', eX" 
Notice that both ~' and ~" are also sentences of L ; wflhout loss of geuerality we 
assume 
Claim 1. ,~'~ =modl,q¢ (3 modLq~", 
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~oot .  Otherwise, let ~eStr(¢A, UrA-) be such that ~ '^~"  (absurdum 
hypothesis); then ~]~' ¢A,~q>' hence .~2 f cA, ~.~1~,,, by the assumption about ¢', 
whence ~ 1' ~' m ~I' by reduct; by isomorphism property of logic L (see [6] or [1]), 
it now follows that 
Similarly we get 
thus contradicting (1) above. [] 
CI.~lilt 2. 3if} E StCL('r) such that mOdLCP'c_ nlodL~p and modLqV'c_ modL--icp. 
Proof. Otherwise, let ~o be a counterexample; then from ~i~,~q~' we get ~,l~,~,~p, 
hence 9.1'~ q~ (as ~I~, I r '~  ~l' and ~p is of type r); similarly, ~I"~-~p, thus contradict- 
ing the assumption in (1) that ?I'~'~-=-L?I"~'r. []
We have thus exhibited two sentences, ¢p' of type TA,, and q~" of type rA,, having 
no common model and such that no sentence q~ of type q'A' n ~r.~. in logic L can 
'separate' ¢p' and q~", in the sense of Claim 2 above; this shows that interpolation 
fails and proves our result about L. [] 
By combining Corollary 5.4 and Proposition 5.6 together, we immediately get 
the following partial answer to H. Friedman's third problem in [7]: "'No logic 
strictly between L~,~ and L~ obeys the interpolation theorem": 
Corollary 5.7. (Assuming ~o is the only measurable cardinal.) No logic L satisfying 
the condition L ~ L~., obeys the interpolation theorem, unless L~<xhL. 
Remark 5.8. Thus, no logic t~etween L~o and L~ obeys the interpolation 
theorem unless its complete theories are able to characterize every s'ructure up to 
isomorphism, in which case Friedman's problem is still open. For similar results 
dealing with such particular cases as L~ or logics between L~,~ and L~.. see 
[3, 8, 13, 14]. 
Added in proof 
The author has recently found a simpler proof of Corollary 5.7, ~ithout assuming 
that co is the only measurable cardinal (see [24]). 
References 
Friedrnan's third pn~blem 211 
[1] K.J+ Barwise+ Axioms for abstract model theory, Ann, Math. l.,ogic 7 (1974) 221-265. 
i2] f.],V. ~udt'lowsky and D,V, ~udnowsky, Rc+>~ularnye i ubyvajm~che n polnye ultrafiltri, Dokl, 
Akad, Nauk. SSSR 198 (197/) 779-782, 
13] M,A Dickntann+ lau'ge tnfinitary Languages (Noah-Holland, Amsterdam, 1976). 
[4] S. Feferman, T~x,o notes on abstract model theory, I+ Fund. Math. 82 (1974) 153-165. 
[5] S, Feferman, 7"+, notes on abstract model theory, II, Fund. Math, 89 (1975) 111-130. 
[6] J, Plum, First Order Logic and Its Extensions, Lecture Notes in Math. Vol. 499 (Springer, Berlin, 
1976) pp, 248-310. 
[7] H. Friedman, One hundred and two problems in mathematical logic, J. Symbolic Logic 40 (1975) 
113-129. 
[8] J. Gregory, Beth definability in infinitary languages, J Symbolic Logic 39 (1974) 22-26. 
[9] R.B. Jeusen and B,J, Koppelberg, A note on ultrafi/ters, Notices AMS 78T-E21. 
[10] H.J.Keisler, Constructkms in model theory, CIME II ciclo+ coord+ M~mgani, in: Cremonese, d., 
M~lel Theory and Applications (Roma, 1977). 
[I t] H.J+ Keisler, Fundamentals of model theory, in: K.J. Barwise, ed., Handbook of Mathematical 
Logic (North-Hdland, Amsterdam, 1977) pp. 47-104. 
[12] K. Kunen and K, Prikry, Dcseendingly incomplete uttrafilters, J. Symbolic Logic 36 (1971) 
65O--652. 
[13] J.E. Hutchinson, Model theory via set theory, Israel J. Math. 24 (1976) 2,%-304. 
[14] J+ Malitz. lnfinitaty analogs of theorems from fil~t order mode~ theory. J Symbolic Logic 36 
{1971) 216-228. 
[151 J.D+ ~'Jonk+ Mathematical Logic (Springer-Verlag+ Berlin, t t)76). 
[161 J.A. Makowsky and S. Shelaia, The theorems of Beth and Craig in abstract model th+~ory I: the 
aivstract ~tting, Trans AMS 256 (t979) 215-239. 
[17] J.A. Makowsky, S+ Shelah and J. Stavi, ~-togics and generalized quantifiers, Ann. Math. Logic 
10 (1976) 155-192. 
[18] D. Mundici, Applicatious of many-sorted Rohinson consistency theorem, Z. Math, Logik 27 
(1981) 181-188. 
[19] D, Mundici, Robinson's consistency theorem in soft mode! theor}, Trans. AMS 263 (1981) 
231-24t. 
[20] D, Mundici, Compactness = JEP in any logic. Fund. Malh. 116 (1982) to appear. 
[2~] D. Mundici, An algebraic result about soft model theoretical equivalence relations with an 
application to H+ Friedman's fourth problem, J. Symbolic Logic 46 (1981) 523-530. 
Additional references 
[22] D. Mundici, Duality between logk~ and equivalence r lations, Trans. AMS 270 (1982) t 11-129. 
[23] D, Mundici, Interl~3iatiota, compactness and JEP in soft m~xlel theory, Archly Math, Logik 22 
(1982), to appear, 
[24] D+ Mundiei, Variations on Friedman's third and fourth problem, it: Proceedings of the Inter- 
national Conference "Ot~n Days for Model Theory and Set Th,.'o~'", Warsaw, September 
2~. ~26. 1981 (H. Rasiowa and W+ Marek. organizers)+ 
